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Abstract:  With the deployment of lethal autonomous weapons, there is the requirement that any such platform complies  
with the precepts of International Humanitarian Law.  Humanitarian Algorithms[9: p. 9] ensure that lethal autonomous  
weapon systems perform military/security operations, within the confines of International Humanitarian Law. Unlike other 
existing techniques of regulating lethal autonomy this scheme advocates for an approach that enables Machine Learning.  
Lethal autonomous weapons must be equipped with appropriate fail-safe mechanisms that locks them if they malfunction.
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0 Introduction
The codified key protocol for activating lethal autonomous weapons using humanitarian algorithms 
goes beyond the Arkin Ethical Governor approach that acts  as a “bottleneck” to already generated 
lethal impulses.  It allows for the initiating of lethal action by an autonomous weapon system only upon 
complete verification that any such targeting action complies with Laws of War, Rules of Engagement, 
Ethics  of  Owner  and Worldview of  Owner  –  these  parameters  are  used  to  set  the  activation  rule 
parameters while the target characteristics act as the weapons release keys.  
This  protocol  goes  further  to  advance  a  process  for  multi-robot  collaboration  amongst  several 
(semi)autonomous entities, by way of transfer and sharing of tasks in a battle-space.  There are existing 
architectures such as the Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems[1] but is not specifically designed 
and optimized for lethal autonomous robots.  Hopefully this new safety switching protocol for lethal 
autonomous  robots  shall  offer  some  suggestions  about  how  an  autonomous  weapon  can  be 
deactivated/neutralized in the event of a cessation of hostilities.  Other thought-provoking propositions 
would be the ability of the system to determine difficult to discern human traits such as treachery or 
courage and to register, record or report the same.
1 Brief author introduction: Nyagudi Musandu (1973 -), male, Independent researcher, humanitarian informatics.  Email 
: nyagudim@yahoo.com
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1 Rationale
Over fifty of the world's nations are today developing and/or using tactical robots, these range from 
bomb disposal robots, aerial surveillance drones and unmanned underwater vehicles.  The classification 
of unmanned autonomous weapons could be extended to include some classes of naval mines and 
tactical missile systems.  Given the ubiquitous nature of lethal autonomy, it is a phenomena that should 
be harnessed for the right reasons and no ban is expected anytime in the near future, as it offers a 
natural progression from many current remote controlled platforms.  
Mizroch [2] documents Israel Air Force's nascent attempts at defining the realm of lethal autonomy. 
Probably influenced by the Arkin Ethical Governor, there is the terminology Ethical Algorithms in the 
publication.  The perspective put forward in this paper is that a lethal autonomous weapon can only be 
ethical to the extent that its user/owner is ethical. Mies [3] suggests that robots can replace man in 
battle-space  for  reasons  of  cost  reduction,  quality  and  efficacy at  implementation  of  international 
humanitarian law, without detailing how this can be achieved in the foreseeable future.
Even with the seemingly pervasive deployment of autonomous weapons technologies, there are still 
those opposed to their full-scale adoption by military forces, some of whom are calling for a world-
wide ban.  Sharkey [4]  strongly sets  out  the opinion that  robots are  not  capable of distinguishing 
between combatants and non-combatants, a position that is not true to the extent that there are a wide  
range of machine learning methods.  This paper suggests some configurations that would lead to a wide 
range of “innocents discrimination tests” being implemented by lethal autonomous weapons.
2 Review of some Theories
Murphy  et  al [5]  advocates  for  approaches  to  robot  “behaviour”  administration,  in  summary they 
revolve around concepts such as deployment of the highest legal and professional standards in design, 
development and use of  robots; robots being able to discriminate effective the roles of different human 
persons and in making such distinction interacting or reacting to them appropriately; robots autonomy 
should aid its self preservation to the extent that it is functioning properly.  There are many innovative 
concepts in the article such as a black box system for robot perception and operations recording, it is 
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assumed  that  data  obtained  would  aid  investigations  if  required.   Other  functions  that  would  be 
provided for via such data are design improvements, innovation and machine learning.
The protocol put forward in this paper suggests some ways and means that can be used to achieve the 
tenets that are the “Alternative Laws of Responsible Robotics” [5], but the extent to which some of the 
researchers objectives could be met, may be questionable as they go on to describe robots as being able 
to attain morality, something that is only in the realm of deep philosophical debates.  What would 
suffice to meet the requirement of the Alternative Laws would be robots to have sufficiently sensitive 
sensors and processing systems to maximize the benefits of exploitation of sensor data-streams.
When considering machine learning there may be a lot  of market hype about artificial intelligence 
aiding the ultimately programmed robot to achieve great feats, this in turn leads to study and research  
of a wide range of algorithms.  Notably the quality and sensitivity of sensors is the primary determinant 
of machine learning algorithms, that can be deployed in robotics.  One cannot engage in a quest for 
development of the “ultimate” Deep Learning Algorithms for robots if he or she is not equipped with 
the “ultimate” sensors, that generate the ultimate data-streams into a robot's control system.   To avoid 
coming up with any unreliable learning methods, this paper suggests where they can be used but does  
not attempt to produce any specific learning methods.
Text,  speech  and  graphics  provide  a  wide  range  of  sentiment  expression  –  persons  may  express 
themselves in relation to various events, processes, practices, etc. these are formally known as domains 
in the realm of sentiment analysis.  An adequately equipped autonomous robot would tap into mass 
media and other  communication/archiving systems with a  view to gleaning from the chatter  some 
valuable nuggets of actionable intelligence.  Sensors for capturing sentiment are well advanced and of 
high resolution of primary interest would be their capture and analysis of actual real world events into 
sentiment analysis reports that are deduced via analytic methods.
Internet  chatter,  the  electromagnetic  spectrum  based  communications,  etc.  are  a  vast  pool  of 
information on infractions  against  international  humanitarian law in the course of armed conflicts. 
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Sentiment analysis [6] via informatics classifies this communication chatter across appropriate tactical 
domains which are then consumed as intelligence or humanitarian relief reports.  
Deep  Learning  Algorithms  offer  new  approaches  for  analyzing  layered  sensor  inputs  in  form of 
graphics, speech and text – a participant in subject chatter could be assessed for intellectual depth, 
personal preferences, and other idiosyncratic traits.  But sentiment analysis tools are domain specific 
yet the fast evolving nature of a conflict may demand that they are equipped with Domain Adaptation 
capabilities for identifying and classifying chatter from hereto unclassified sources.  Deep Learning 
discovers abstractions from multiple layers of data.  In order to achieve Domain Adaptation a source 
domain classifier must be mapped onto a target domain classifier via an Intermediate Representation.  
It would be good to design a protocol and related weapon system with Deep Learning [6] eg. For 
sentiment analysis, yet this remains an unrealistic expectation, as a result of the extensive demands of  
such a system specification.   Inevitably the unpredictable and fast evolving nature of armed conflicts, 
requires Deep Learning Algorithms of the Domain Adaptation type but protocols for such systems are 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
Another category of Deep Learning that would contribute towards more efficient autonomous robots is 
the multi-modal type [7], this is when as system learns of an event by way of different modes eg. 
Sound and sight,  thereafter  a  multi-modal  system can assess  and determine  any future  occurrence 
purely by either of the modes.  
Unsupervised Learning on a lethal autonomous weapon would be acceptable as the basis for decisions, 
if and only if its results are applied for purposes of constraining and/or inspecting propositions for 
lethal actions.  However should the results of unsupervised learning by lethal autonomous weapons, be 
used for initiating and executing lethal action, it would imply that any such weapon is self-willed and 
can make up its “mind” on the best course of action without regard to the tactical objectives of its 
owners.    Nonetheless technology described [7] of multi-modal type deep learning is still a long way 
from actualization, some of the reasons being:
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1. Unrealistically long learning times of no utility to immediate tactical mission decision making
2.  Computing power described in [7] cannot be hosted on an unmanned aerial vehicle for 
             reasons of its extremely large installation size
3.  15.8% accuracy for object recognition against 20,000 categories is not good enough for real    
             world war-fighting
4.  it is not designed for mobile robots.
This Capability vs. Practicality Gap is a certainty when considering a broad spectrum of technologies 
that seem to have applicability in the domain of lethal autonomy.  The implication of this determination 
is  that a technological protocol for controlling lethal autonomy should be founded on practicality and 
not on seemingly super capabilities that are nowhere near being applied in systems integration.  
Arkin [8] offers a technical solution for controlling lethal autonomy, it however lacks a broad range of 
autonomous capabilities that are difficult to implement, eg.
1. The  ethical  governor  does  not  incorporate  autonomous  continuous  learning  and 
consultation/collaboration  between  a  lethal  autonomous  weapon  and  other  related  external 
autonomous platforms
2. It presumes the existence of a “human-adjusting-the-loop”
3. It can only be implemented with a finite set of behaviourial patterns scrutiny capability
Veritably it is only possible to make a determination if a lethal autonomous weapon complies with 
international  humanitarian law,  if  it  is  captured,  dismantled,  tested and analyzed by engineers and 
scientists, eg. 
1. its computer program executable code is decompiled
2. its circuit boards, sensors and actuators are analyzed 
3. test runs for performance and responses are undertaken
Arkin's description of the Ethical Governor constrains already generated lethal response signals and 
does not on its own accord generate valid, legal and effective lethal actions.  Simply  stated in his own 
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words the ethical governor is a system bottleneck.  With the critical nature of the increased speed of 
execution of an OODA(Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) Loop, the last thing that one would want on a 
lethal autonomous weapon would be a system bottleneck.  In effect the assumption is that without 
Arkin's  Ethical  Governor  a  lethal  weapon  would  be  non-discriminative  and  disproportional  in  its 
responses, hardly what one would expect of a system that exhibits autonomy.
There are more real world problems and situations than are computer programs to handle and react to 
them.  One would easily assume that an insufficient number of constraints are found within the ethical 
governor, which may in fact turn it into a functionality choke and not a bottleneck. It may be a choke,  
that prevents a wide range of legitimate lethal actions and in the long run renders an autonomous 
weapon system that has it installed ineffective for military usage.  Another notable problem with the 
Arkin Ethical Governor is that it  does not incorporate any form of autonomous learning within its 
system design, making it completely dependent on human based adjustment.
3 The Protocol
The following steps would be utilized by the suggested safety switch protocols for lethal autonomous 
weapons in effecting their OODA(Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) Loops:
Step(1) :  The lethal autonomous weapon system would activate its target acquisition and designation 
                functions based upon its “world view” and learning capabilities.
Step(2) :  A target is identified and its characteristics acquired by the weapon system
Step(3) :  Processing of target characteristics is undertaken with a view to labeling the target as neutral, 
               friendly, or hostile.  If it determines that the target is hostile an appropriate lethal response is   
               immediately selected
Step(4) :  The weapon system is switched on and engages the target
Step(5) :  System then conducts a battle damage assessment by way of acquiring new target   
                characteristics to determine if the target has been neutralized
Step(6) :  If the target is still hostile Step(3) to Step(5) are conducted again, else it concludes that the  
                target has been neutralized
Step(7) :  The Mission is Accomplished or other autonomous lethal weapon systems collaborate to  
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                complete the mission
Step(8) :  The system learns more about targeting with on-board and off-board data and auto- 
                configuration capabilities
Step(9) :  New inspection and constraining methods for lethal action are brought on-line into the system 
                loop during servicing/maintenance
Step(10) : System re-activated and initiates the target searching process 
Unlike the Arkin model that claims its system to have the means of behaving morally and determining 
other parameters such as Ethics and Military Necessity.  The safety switch protocol approach assumes 
that the vital threshold of Military Necessity has been attained and is not a matter to be encoded into 
the autonomous weapon system – as such the morality, ethics, behaviour, culpability and  tactics of the 
human person who deploys such a system comes into focus.  An already fielded weapon system would 
be in no position to make its determination on issues such as Military Necessity as that would imply 
that it is in effect self-willed and can make its own military decisions for its own benefit.
Proportionality in the realm of the safety switch protocol type lethal autonomous weapons would imply 
that an appropriate response is selected during a specific mission in response to a perceived hostile 
entity.  This interpretation would be markedly different from the interpretation of proportionality in 
response  to  the  action/event   by  hostiles  that  occasioned  the  Military  Necessity  resulting  in  the 
deployment of the autonomous weapon in the first instance.  Overall proportionality in the overall 
prosecution of military operations is again left to human judgment of those who unleash the system into 
the operational environment as they are best placed to select the appropriate response sets.
Stage 1 – Target Characteristics Acquisition
Fine grained, high resolution type discrimination/distinction of potential targets, is required if the safety 
switch protocol is to be effected.  Target characteristics of interest would be:
1. Place,position and/or location
2. Activity, action, emissions and/or behaviour
3. Possession, use and/or abuse
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4. Movement and/or direction
5. Grouping, formation, co-ordination, association and/or collaboration
6. Markings, sighting, observations and/or image
7. Sound, noise, voice and/or proclamation, etc.
This  list  is  indeed  much  longer  and  dependent  upon  sensor-types  that  are  available  to  a  lethal 
autonomous weapon.  Setting of pre-mission perceptual thresholds assures one that an autonomous 
weapon system would not engage targets based on some self-generated unsupervised learning of its 
operational environment but other forms of unsupervised learning may be permitted eg. In the course of 
battle damage assessments.  This is in effect a notable difference from Arkin's system where once ρ-
permissible is executed by the autonomous weapon the system cannot learn of its violations but only 
makes suggestions of potential  violations/mistakes to an operator and/or deliberative system before 
effecting any such action.
Stage 2 – Codified Keys Generation
A safety switch protocol autonomous weapon system utilizes target characteristics from sensor data-
streams to generate codified keys that then switch on or constrain the weapon accordingly.  A codified 
key is divided into segments.  In this protocol definition no attempt is made to minimize the number of 
segments in the codified key.  For example an autonomous weapon system should have a codified key 
generated each time it senses a target, even for the same target at different times, different codified keys 
are generated each with unique time-stamps. 
Segmentation of a Codified key takes the following form:  eg. Codified key(X), Codified key(Y), etc.
Codified key (X) = {Segment(1) | Segment(2) | Segment (3) | ….. | Segment(n-1) | Segment(n) }
Example of Segment definitions :
Segment(1): Autonomous weapon system identification number
Segment(2): Autonomous weapon system name
Segment(3): Target identification number
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Segment(4): Target identification name
Segment(5): Nature of target : eg. hostile, friend, undetermined or neutral
Segment(6): Time-stamp
Segment(7): Target characteristics from sensor results
Segment(8): Target status eg. Active, dormant, neutralized, undetermined
Segment(9): Target status eg. Combatant or non-combatant
Segment(10): Assumed value of target : e.g. economic value, human life value, strategic value, etc
Segment(11): Resource availability within the weapon system platform, eg. Fuel, endurance, weapons
Segment(n-1): Codified keys of other targets in the vicinity
Segment(n):  Codified keys of associated friendly weapon and support systems in the vicinity
The inclusion of segment terms Segment(n-1) and Segment(n) implies that there could be many other 
segments within the keys giving the autonomous weapon system ever more functionality.  Codified 
keys can be exchanged [9: p. 9] between various autonomous weapon systems and command centres in 
the course of collaboration/co-ordination for purposes of optimization of resources during operations.  
The exchange of codified keys between lethal autonomous weapons allows for swapping of operations. 
A lethal autonomous weapon should call in other lethal autonomous weapon(s) to conduct an operation 
for which they have more appropriate mission payloads.  A swap between a mobile and a stationary 
robot would only require the two robots involved.  In situations where  there are more than one mobile 
target an extra robot is required in most instances to prevent target loss during a swap.  
Notably unlike the Arkin approach this protocol does not use only the terminologies combatants and 
non-combatants since they do not suffice.  In many instances extra information is required because 
some combatants are friendly, while others are hostile hence the utilization of additional terminologies 
such as hostile, friendly and neutral in Segments (5), (8) & (9).  Codified keys are critical as they 
should facilitate :
1. Machine Learning for Situational Awareness and Mission execution by Autonomous weapons
2. Graphic display of the digitized battle-space at a command centre
Page 9 of 14
Humanitarian Algorithms : A Codified Key Safety Switch Protocol for Lethal Autonomy [12]
3. Co-operative “thinking” and co-ordination between Autonomous weapons
4. Detailed digital archiving of the evolving battle-space for review by commanders
5. Co-operation between manned and autonomous platforms
6. Black box type functions for investigating weapon system malfunctions and/or errors
7. Research, design, improvements and innovation
With the codified key implementations on lethal autonomous weapons the following types of attacks 
would be facilitated :
1. Pre-programmed attacks that are executed autonomously
2. Intelligent attacks where the switch learns of and reasons about the target
3. Induced  attacks  :  these  are  not  desired  but  they  must  be  anticipated.   They  occur  when 
tampering, deception and/or interference with the switch causes undesired weapons release
A lot of previous work in the domain of lethal autonomy is based on Arkin's research, of great interest 
is his ability to produce part of the source code of lethal autonomous weapon systems in his published 
research.   But  his  work  is  done  primarily  for  the  military  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  
implication being that a lot of it is not published, eg. We have not go the whole range of source code, 
and hardware on which he bases his work, this paper is an attempt to develop an open, international, 
and technology neutral approach to handling safety and ethics issues in Lethal Autonomy.  Other of his 
views such as those on classification of autonomy have not found much favour in Kaminski et al [10].  
Kaminski et al [10] details the growing demand for autonomy in military systems in countries such as 
China and the USA, it also calls for open architectures at least within the military forces of the USA, 
where any such systems shall be well understood by commanders and operators.
Stage 3 – The Switching System
The Codified keys invoke any one of the switching rules in the third stage.  Before the switching rules 
are invoked a codified key is symmetrically replicated and forwarded to the switching rule modules as 
well as the command module, if more than one switching rule is invoked the command module shall 
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detect the anomaly as a Key Clash as it receives all invoked switch rules and shall wait for another 
codified key.  If action on the basis of the first codified key has not been executed after the key clash,  
the command module nullifies all invoked actions.  Command module also deals with communications.
This  safety  switch  protocol  system could  be  installed  on  a  weapon  system  platform such  as  an 
unmanned aerial vehicle, similarly it can and  should also be implemented on specific weapons borne 
by the unmanned aerial vehicle or robot such as tactical missiles.  Sensors continuously pass on data for 
codified keys into the switching system allowing for implementation of a wide range of reality checks.
Switching Rules
Rule(1):  Pre-programmed attack allowed/accepted switch rule – invokes a pre-programmed attack
Rule(2):  Not-forbidden switch rule – invites a human-operator to execute the attack
Rule(3):  Forbidden switch rule – prevents an attack by the weapon system as it is not permitted by way 
                of Laws of War and/or Rules of Engagement
Rule(4):   Attack-aggressor switch rule – autonomous weapon system senses/detects hostile action and 
                 reacts by attacking the originating aggressor or their supporting structures
Rule(5):  Disarmament switch rule – if mobility fails or capture occurs by way of non-combatants or 
                non-hostiles disarmament occurs and on-board weapons are neutralized
Rule(6):  Self-destruct switch rule 1 – if mobility fails destroy the weapon
Rule(7):  Self-destruct switch rule 2 – self-destruct if weapon is captured by hostiles
Rule(8):  Target-surrendered switch rule – targeted entity indicates by compliance of surrender demand 
                and it therefore tracked continuously but not attacked
Rule(9):  “Gotcha” switch rule – an autonomous weapon learns by way of observation, that  a target is 
                 hostile by way of its characteristics and behaviourial traits and initiates an attack 
Rule(10):  Mistaken-abort switch rule – eg. A missile flying towards a target having been launched with 
                  prior codified keys, deduces that the “man planting a road-side bomb”, is actually a toddler 
                  playing a game of marbles and automatically aborts the attack
Rule(11):  Cessation of hostilities switch rule – effected in conjunction with a command centre eg. 
                  robot learns from its time-stamps, that a cease fire time table has come into effect
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Rule(12):  Impossible-abort switch rule – switch does not initiate execution of an attack after detecting 
                  errors or other faults within the segments of the codified key, ie. A malfunction of the 
                 sensors, hardware , software, etc.
Rule(13):  By-pass switch rule – codified key noted but does not override previously invoked key
Rule(14): Override switch rule – override already invoked key and switch off action if not initiated or 
                 finalized and system must await a new key
An autonomous weapon should have continuous generation and processing of codified keys in relation 
to a specific target until it is neutralized or the attack is aborted.
Sketch of Codified Key Safety Switch Protocol System
--
 |------------------------------|                           |---------------------------------------------|
 |  Stage 1 : Sensor(s)        |----------------- > |  Stage 2 – Codified key generator     | 
 |                                        |                           |                                                            | 
 |------------------------------|                           |---------------------------------------------|
                                                                                                   |
                                                                                                   |
                                                                                                  \|/
--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
                                                                  |------------------------|------------------|                  |
                                                                  | Symmetrical key replicator            |                  | 
                                                                  |-------------------------|-----------------|                  |
Stage 3: Switching system                                                          |                                         | 
                                                                                                   \|/                                        |
    |-----------------------------------|             |-------------------------|------------------| 
    |  Command Module               | < ---- >|              Switch rule(n), etc.             |                 | 
    |-----------------------------------|             |-------------------------|------------------|                 |  
                                                                                                    |                                         |
                                                                                                    |                                         |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
                                                                                                   \|/
                                                                 |--------------------------|-----------------|
                                                                 | Weapon(s) or Actuator System(s)    |
                                                                 |                                                          |
                                                                 |------------------------------------------- |
--
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Fidelity, sensitivity, resolution and high quality of sensor gear on-board a lethal autonomous weapon 
determines the complexity and sophistication of codified keys generated for safety switching protocols 
and the details of the functionality that they can initiate and control.
4 Conclusion
Inevitably to  carry out tasks and to  obtain mission objectives,  resources  are  required,  this  gives  a 
justification for  inclusion of  Segment(11)  in  the  codified key – the  resource  availability indicator. 
Warwela [11] is a detailed theoretical study on the issue of resource management in robots, with a view 
to attaining operational self-sufficiency. 
Implementation of machine learning can occur within the codified key generator and the switching 
system, but at this stage specific implementations have not been proposed for reasons that they would 
be specific to any hardware platform and software environment.  The implication of incorporating them 
into a protocol description would be that of developing a proprietary and not open protocol which is not 
in line with the objectives of this paper.
It is not within the scope of this paper to develop actual computer source code for an autonomous 
weapon  system,  but  there  are  some  suggestions  on  how  to  go  about  upholding  International 
Humanitarian Law if  your are a professional working in the domain of lethal autonomous weapon 
systems engineering.  Hopefully these insights shall lead to a safer, stable and more peaceful world.
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